Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 
Title: Lindhal meets Condorcet?
Author-Name: Sayantan Ghosal 
Author-Name: Łukasz Woźny 
Abstract: Although a Condorcet winner commands a majority in its favor, there is no guarantee of unanimity. In a Lindahl equilibrium, a suitably chosen system of personalized transfers and prices ensures unanimity, but there is no guarantee of a majority vote in its favor. Do Lindahl equilibria decentralize Condorcet winners? In a setting where voters' preferences are satiated, characterized by bliss points, this paper proposes a new balancedness condition which is satisfied when a Condorcet winner lies within the interior of the convex hull of voters' bliss points. We show that such a political compromise between the most preferred policies of different voter types can be decentralized as Lindahl equilibria.
Number: 2024-101
Length: 29 pages 
Creation-Date: 2024-09
Keywords: Bliss points, Condorcet winner, Lindhal equilibria, balancedness
Classification-JEL: D50, D61, D71
File-URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12182/1301
File-Format: Application/pdf
DOI: 10.33119/kaewps2024101
Handle: RePEc:sgh:kaewps:2024101